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Chinese discussions about Indian
culture around the May Fourth Era:




1 A decade ago, in his address at the 66th session of the Indian History Congress, Prof.
Kamal Sheel averred that “the earliest Chinese discourses on India [were] based on a
recognition of the latter as the land of an equally ‘civilised’ culture arising out of the
varied and fruitful interaction between them in which Buddhism played a leading role.
In contrast,  the modern Chinese discourses emanate from the framework of  nation
state and are based on comparative studies of their respective polity and economy”
(Sheel 2007). According to Sheel, by the end of the 19th century, the Chinese started
building  up the  narrative  of  an  India  that  would  be  China’s  “failed  other”.  Such a
narrative emerged from “the construct of  nationalism in late imperial  China which
linked the rising threat of Western imperialism to lack of modernisation and formation
of a nation”. To put it in other words, the emergence and diffusion of modern political
concepts such as “state” or “nation” operated as factors of historical change. These
concepts  displaced  the  Chinese  outlook  on  India.  Rebecca  Karl  has  presented this
matter with much pertinence in her book Staging the World (Karl 2002). She has noted
that ‘India’ became a common topos of late Qing political discourses. Its “lostness” and
the “slavishness” of its people were omnipresent themes (Karl 2002, 159–163). It even
became a topic for a new historiographical genre: the histories of the lost countries
(wangguo shi 亡國史). Presenting India under the label of a “lost country” (wang guo 亡
國) was instrumental in the redefinition of Chinese Weltanschauung; the political demise
of India was a counter-example, or a scary reminder that China could also be put under
the control of Western powers.
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2 Yet, to come back to the idea of a transition from a positive culturalistic outlook toward
a negative nationalistic one, one could underline the fact that in defending his position,
Sheel  has  ignored  an  important  element:  the  vocabulary  to  speak  about  what  we
nowadays  call  cultures  or  civilisations  was  developed  later  than,  or  at  least
simultaneously  with,  the  vocabulary  of  state  and nationalism.  Speaking of  “equally
‘civilised’ culture” here is an anachronism or at least a very interpretative translation
of Chinese discourses into contemporary categories. Sheel has considered that the rise
of ‘the modern vocabulary of the nation’ affected the Chinese outlook on China, but he
forgot that there was also no ‘vocabulary of culture and civilisation’ before the end of
the 19th century,  be it  in China,  in India or in the West 1.  And it  took time for this
vocabulary to set in. To give a striking example: the “anthropological interpretation of
culture as ‘the civilisation of a people (particularly at a certain age of development)’
first appears in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1933” (Morris-Suzuki 1995, 761).
3 If by the end of the Qing dynasty, Chinese intellectuals realized that they were part of
an internationalized world with a new centre and various edges,  perhaps they also
started being aware of cultural diversity. The problem was not simply laid out under
the  dichotomy  opposing  a  modern  West  to a  traditional  East.  In  terms  of
historiography,  we  have  long  moved  away  from  the  ‘Levenson  narrative’,  which
proclaimed  that  Chinese  nationalism  emerged  as  “a  denial  of  culturalism”
(Levenson 1958, 105). Moreover, one can no longer summarize the ‘cultural issue’ into
the opposing categories of traditionalism versus westernisation. Embracing modernity
did not necessarily mean throwing away Chinese cultural identity. Therefore, in order
to shed a new light on the Chinese attitude toward India and what we would call its
‘culture’, it  appears  necessary  to  reconsider  under  which  neologisms  and  modern
concepts the Chinese intellectuals approached their southern neighbour. What did the
Chinese say about India with the culture-related conceptual repertoire that was newly
made available by the end of the 19th century – the polysemic terms guocui 國粹 and 
wenming 文明 and then wenhua 文化? Was India still regarded as an “equally ‘civilised’
culture” through this vocabulary or did the positive narrative supposedly conveyed by
these guo- and wen-cognates also turn sour? Furthermore, as concepts are both “causal
factors and indicators of historical changes” (Koselleck 1972, xiv; & 1995, 116), could it
be hypothetically envisioned that the emergence and the rise of wenhua participated in
a  positive  reevaluation  of  India,  that  contrasted  with  the  devaluation  produced  by
wangguo?
4 To quote Madhavi Thampi, in the past decades the Sino-Indian relationship has become
“a topic of mounting interest in academic and wider circles” (Thampi 2013, 202). Yet, in
regard to modern intellectual history, suffice to say that the spotlight has always been
put  on  two  specific  trajectories:  first,  late  Qing  intellectuals’  attitude  toward  India
(notably Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858-1927), Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873-1929) and Zhang
Taiyan 章太炎  (1968-1936) usually in between 1901 and 19072;  second, Rabindranath
Tagore’s (1861–1941) trip to China in 1924 and its consequences. This second area of
interest  is  certainly  the  most  discussed  topic,  since  it  concerned  both  intellectual
history and the history of  literature.  There is  now an impressive body of  academic
literature on Tagore’s trip, and on the new links between China and India that stemmed
from it3.
5 Yet, there is an inexplicable lack of studies concerning the period between 1907 and
1924. During these almost two decades, notably renowned for the profound intellectual
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transformation  they  witnessed  with  the  New  Culture  movement,  the  Chinese  had
certainly much to say about India. As a matter of fact, we are now aware that they were
increasingly  interested  in  the  growing  Indian  nationalist  movement.  Many  articles
covered its different aspects, in particular in the Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi 東方
雜誌)  (Deepak 2001,  14).  This  magazine  dedicated  a  special  issue  to  “Gandhi and
Modern India” in 1922 during the Civil Disobedience movement. Brian Tsui has now
uncovered the Chinese interest in Gandhism. He has shown that “Chinese intellectuals
took the Indian freedom movement seriously” and that the Indian nationalist struggle
served in China as a medium “to interrogate Western modernity as a social or cultural
formation”  (Tsui 2014,  63).  Indeed,  having  browsed  other  documents  than  the  one
studied by Deepak and Tsui – notably the Shanghai-based journal Shishi xinbao 時事新
報 – I  can renew their  claims and attest  that in the early twenties,  almost no week
passed  without  an  article  published  on  what  was  happening  in  India.  Despite  the
articles often being of reduced size, it seems nonetheless that the topic was of interest
for the readership.
6 As such, the research on the Chinese attitude toward India has already underlined the
fact that India was a political object of interest during the May Fourth era. It remains,
however, to be verified whether ‘Indian culture’ was an object of inquiry. Between the
mid-1910s and the mid-1920s, an important series of controversies that have often been
framed under the label “debate(s) about the Eastern and Western cultures” (Dong Xi
wenhua lunzhan 東西文化論戰) emerged4. Much ink has already been dedicated to the
arguments and the rhetoric of these debates, notably regarding the thorny problem of
whether China ought to ‘westernise’ itself. However, hardly any one investigated the
place of India in these discussions5. After all, Chinese intellectuals were not limited to
two intellectual possibilities – either westernise or defend Chinese culture –they could
also  have  decided  to  ‘indianise’  China.  Despite  this  option being  unlikely,  it  was  a
theoretical possibility. India could have been a source of inspiration to rethink what it
meant to be part of a bigger ensemble such as the region of Asia or the East6. Some
scholars  have  suggested  that  India,  as  a  ‘representative  of  Eastern civilisation’  was
instrumental in the development of the arguments held by conservative figures who
upheld  a  critical  outlook  toward  the  West.  In  an  article  on  Xu  Dishan  許地山
(1893-1941) and Indian culture, Chen Pingyuan once wrote that “during the May Fourth
era, the traditionalists (fugu pai 復古派) were the biggest proponents of Indian culture
(Yindu  wenhua  印度文化)  and  they  carried  forward  the  idea  that  India  was  a
representative of Eastern civilisation (Dongfang wenming de daibiao 東方文明的代表) not
only in order to defend the Chinese ‘national quintessence’ (guocui 國粹) but also to
fight the New Culture movement (xin wenhua yundong 新文化運動)” (Chen 1984, 34).
However, one may wonder if this was really the case at a general level and not simply
for Xu. Also, was this position expressed in the words used by Chen?
7 It is this thesis that the present article wishes to challenge by reconsidering where and
how ‘Indian culture’ was located in the Chinese discourses during May Fourth so-called
‘debate(s)  about  the  Eastern  and  Western  cultures’.  Besides,  in  order  to  keep  the
problem of Tagore’s visit distinct from what Chinese thought more generally of India – 
no single man is  the embodiment of  the entirety of  one continental  culture – I  will
mainly  focus  on  the  period  before  the  debate  was  annexed  by  the  fights  over  his
lectures  in  1924.  I  argue  that  although  some  Chinese  intellectuals  had  a  genuine
interest  in  the  Indian  culture – understood  from  an  etic  point  of  view  or,  using  a
koselleckian  terminology,  from  our  contemporary  categories  of  knowledge
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(Erkenntniskategorien)– considered from an emic point of view, there is in the language
of the sources (Quellensprache) no interest for an ‘Indian culture’. More exactly an Yindu
wenhua  印度文化 that  could  be  considered  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  Western
culture (Xifang wenhua 西方文化) and the Chinese culture (Zhongguo wenhua 中國文化)
is nowhere to be found. Unlike what Chen Pingyuan has argued, India had no place in
the  Chinese  Kulturpessimismus.  Furthermore,  it  appears  that  most  of  the  Chinese
intellectuals, like their Japanese neighbours, used the term ‘Eastern culture’ (Dongfang
wenhua  東方文化)7 without  really  considering  it  as  an  equivalent  for  the  Western
notion of  Orient  or  as  an embodiment of  both China and India.  It  was often but  a
synonym of  Chinese culture only8.  As  such,  the emergence of  a  modern concept of
culture under the token wenhua did not lead to the highlighting of an Indian culture
that  would  be  autonomous  from  Indian  political  institutions.  Furthermore,  Indian
wenhua was always considered through the prism of Buddhism.
8 The article will proceed in three phases. First, I will briefly consider the place of India
in the intellectual discursive field during the late 1910s and early 1920s. Second, I will
discuss  the  place  of  Indian  culture  in  the  rhetoric  of  several  intellectuals.  Special
attention will be given here to the expression ‘Eastern culture’ (Dongfang wenhua) and
how its use incidentally scrapped India out of the debates. The last part of the article
will then question whether Liang Shuming梁漱溟 (1893-1988) was really an exception
in this intellectual landscape. Finally, I shall conclude that India as a wenhua had no
significant place in the debates, and that such an aporia should invite us to reconsider
our  outlook  on  how  Chinese  intellectuals  envisioned  cultural  diversity  in  the  May
Fourth era.
What place for “Indian culture” in the discursive field?
9 To  begin  our  inquiry  on  the  May  Fourth  era  intellectuals’  attitude  toward  Indian
culture,  one  should  notice  that  two  important  changes  had  taken  place  since  the
beginning  of  the  century:  India  as  an  object  of  inquiry  entered  new academic
institutions9, and the multiplication of intellectual newspapers and magazines offered a
space where texts about India could be published and become easily accessible for a
broader readership.
10 Considering the problem first from the angle of education, one needs to admit that
India,  and  notably  ancient  India,  was  progressively  given  a  place  in  the  emerging
University system. Thanks to the impulse of Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868-1940), a course
on Indian philosophy was opened in 1917 at Beijing University (Wang 1998, 98),  the
chair being attributed to the young Liang Shuming. who was to publish two years later
his Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Yindu zhexue gailun 印度哲學概論) (Liang 1919). The
Indologist Alexander Von Staël-Holstein (1877–1937), who emigrated to China after the
October  Revolution  in  Russia,  also  taught  Sanskrit,  the  history  as  well  as  the
philosophies  and religions of  ancient  India  at  Beijing University  from 1922 to  1929
(Wang 1998, 99). Liang Qichao, who was still one of the most important Beijing-based
scholar of that time, also harboured a vested interest in the relation between China and
India, notably regarding Buddhism10.  In 1922, Tang Yongtong湯用彤  (1893-1964) also
started teaching and researching the history of Indian philosophy and Buddhism in
Nanjing. The results of his research would notably begin to be published in 1924 in the
periodical Xueheng 學衡. At Yenching University, Jian Youwen 簡又文 (1896-1978) also
started teaching classes on the history of Indian religions in 1924 (Meyer 2014, 318).
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11 Nor  was  it  impossible  to  find  texts  that  dealt  with  Indian  culture  in  publications
generally available to the public.  To name but a few, in an article published in the
Eastern Miscellany, Li Jihuang 李繼煌  (1891-1960), who was a student in Japan at that
time, discussed the Indian conception of the world and how Indians pictured the idea of
an  Indian  nation  or  state,  by  considering  the  sources  for  such  ideas  in  classical
literature and religions (Li 1918)11. Teng Ruoqu 滕若渠 (dates unknown) also published
in the same journal an article on classical literature in Sanskrit in which he concluded
that  these literary materials  “should be considered in the discussion about  Eastern
culture(s)”  (Teng 1921,  70).  However,  as  noted before,  one should admit  that,  aside
Buddhism-related literature,  most  of  the articles  that  dealt  with India  were mainly
focused  on  its  political  and  economic  trajectories.  Besides,  authors  who  presented
elements of Indian culture to the general public were often lesser-known intellectuals,
whose impact on society was minimal.
12 Another feature of the articles related to ‘Indian culture’ was that they all had more or
less something to do with Tagore. The richness of Indian intellectual and artistic life
was  often  approached  through  the  lens  of  the  relevance  of  the  1913  Nobel  Prize.
References to him came up in almost every article related to the topic. Many of his
texts, notably his poetry and novels, were also translated into Chinese12. And, as a great
deal  of  research has already demonstrated,  they were not  without influence in the
development of modern Chinese literature. Tagore also appeared as soon as 1916 as “a
sharp critic of modern Western civilisation” (Das 2005, 90). Actually, the Indian critique
toward Western civilisation was presented to the Chinese audience before Tagore’s visit
of 1924. Sadhana, the Realization of Life (Tagore 1913), the book that popularized Tagore’s
cultural  discourse  in  the  West  and  in  Japan  (Hay 1970,  85–86)  was  translated  into
Chinese in 1921 (Taigu 1921). The translator Wang Qianjia王錢家 (dates unknown) is a
completely unknown figure. His text was, however, issued in four editions by 1926. It
was seemingly an economic success.  In fact,  a growing body of literature about the
Indian  poet  started  being  published  in  the  early  twenties,  especially  after  it  was
announced that he would visit China.
13 Articles that dealt with the cultural discourses of other great Indians thinkers were,
however, less numerous. They mostly were concerned with M. K. Gandhi (1869–1948).
In the Eastern Miscellany special issue about the civil disobedience movement, an article
by Xu Hualu 徐化魯 (1902-1994) suggested that Gandhi agreed with the idea that the
post-war Western wenhua was bankrupt (Hualu, 1922, 72), but it did not expand on the
subject. Xu simply presented him as the “Indian Tolstoy” (Hualu 1922, 75). Hu Yuzhi 胡
愈之 (1896-1986) portrayed Gandhi as an adversary of Western material culture. The
comments  were  however  scarce.  When  his  text  brought  forward  the  question  of
defending “traditional culture” (chuantong de wenhua 傳統的文化), he only gave a short
description of the Brahmo Samaj movement, depicting it as a fierce opponent to the
invasion of Western capitalism and Christianity (Yuzhi 1922, 76). Gandhi was placed in
its  continuity but  exclusively as  a  social  reformer.  The only text  to clearly present
Gandhi’s  position  was  Yi’an’s  亦庵  article  on  the  principle  of  Satyagraha.  In  it,  the
author established a list of 15 propositions by Gandhi concerning modern civilisation
(Yi’an 1922, 84–85)13.
14 These  brief  remarks  bring  forth  two  important elements:  first,  with  perhaps  the
exception  of  Buddhism,  Indian  culture  was  not  often  discussed  as  a  historical  or
cultural object of interest located in the past – despite ancient India having its place in
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the academia –;  on the contrary,  it  was always connected with what contemporary
intellectuals had to say about it. The omnipresent reference to Tagore speaks for itself.
Let  us  underline  that  this  was  also  the  case  in  the  field  of  literature.  Aside  from
Tagore’s novels and poetry, it seems that there was not much enthusiasm for classical
Indian literature. According to Gal Gvili, it was only in 1929 that Xu Dishan “effectively
launched the study of Indian literature in China” by translating Folk Tales of Bengal, a
book written in English by the reverend Lal Behari Day (1824–1894) (Gvili 2015, 173).
Second,  in  the  emerging academia,  India  was  mainly  approached through two new
categories  of  knowledge:  philosophy and religion.  This  phenomenon as  well  as  the
progressive  institutional  and  intellectual  reorganization  of  the  Chinese  Buddhist
religion propelled Buddhism to the centre of the discussions.
15 However, it is worth emphasising that writing about India and its culture (considered
through our analytical categories) is one thing, speculating on the very concept of an
‘Indian culture’ as a concept present in the sources is quite another matter. Indeed, one
needs to wonder what terminology the Chinese intellectuals used to speak about what
we locate now under the term ‘Indian culture’ or ‘Indian civilisation’. Despite the fact
that it elaborated on themes that we would be tempted to locate under the ‘culture’
category, the above-mentioned article by Li Jihuang spoke only once of Yindu wenming
in the entire text (Li 1918, 71). The author never employed wenhua or guocui, as if they
were not very operative overarching concepts. Teng’s article used wenhua but mainly in
relation  to  the  East  and  not  India,  or  simply  as  a  general  or  universal  category14.
Following Reinhart Koselleck, one can say that “a word becomes a concept only when
the entirety of meaning and experience within a sociopolitical context within which
and for which a word is used can be condensed into one word” (Koselleck 1979, 119).
Furthermore, a concept is “an inescapable, irreplaceable part of the political and social
vocabulary (…) Basic concepts combine manifold experiences and expectations in such
a way that they become indispensable to any formulation of the most urgent issues of a
given time” (Koselleck 1996, 64). If Li had no uses for Yindu wenhua in his text, that
means that it was not an indispensable part of the vocabulary to express his opinion on
the matter.
16 Let us therefore consider when Chinese intellectuals started to speak about India in
terms of wenhua – I shall immediately abandon guocui as I was never able to find any
reference  to  India’s  guocui  except  in  the  writing  of  Zhang  Taiyan  (see  notably
Zhang 1907) – and let  us  see  if  it  produced a  change in  the attitude of  intellectuals
toward India. One should, however, be careful; the first occurrence of the phrase Yindu
wenhua  does  not  equate  to  the  emergence  of  Yindu  wenhua  as  a  concept.  The
multiplication  of  occurrences  simply  pinpoints  a  period  of  particular  interest
(Ifversen 2011, 84–85). Since my purpose here is simply to identify a corpus of interest, I
did not go data mining in the manner of Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng (Jin & Liu 2008),
but  used  only  a  common  database  of  historical  research15.  As  wenhua  started
progressively to differentiate itself from wenming from the mid-1910s on (Huang 2011,
15–23),  one should first  check whether Yindu (zhi  or de) wenhua or Yindu (zhi  or de)
wenming were common expressions between the beginning of the Republican era and
Tagore’s visit. To put it bluntly, the answer is no.
17 Between 1911 and 1925, only four different articles included both “India” and “wenhua” 
in their titles or subtitles. They were a translation of an article by Lyman Abbott that
discussed Tagore’s position (Abotuo 1917), a critical presentation of Tagore’s idea by Hu
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Yuzhi (Yuzhi 1921), one text by Wu Jiazhen 吳家鎮 (dates unknown) on “Civilisation of
India, Past and Present” (Wu 1922), and the welcoming address Liang Qichao wrote for
Tagore.  Concerning  Wu’s  article,  which  is  the  only  text  having  the  exact  “Yindu
wenhua” expression in its title, one should remark that it proceeded in an encyclopædic
manner, presenting first briefly in introduction the race, the geography and history of
the  Indians  before  moving  on  to  a  longer  presentation  of  their  religions,  their
philosophical  schools,  their  languages,  India’s  social  structure,  Indian  classical
education, and its contemporary political situation. The last part of the text was the
reproduction of a friend’s letter on Indian cultural institutions (wenhua jiguan 文化機
關)16 and how the past was protected in India. Wu concluded with a presentation of
Tagore.  Here again,  India as a wenhua was partly approached through the prism of
Tagore. The same could be said of the use of Yindu wenming,  since the only articles
mentioning the two terms in their title were a one-page discussion of Tagore’s division
between “material” and “spiritual” civilisation (Shen 1920) and an interview of Tagore
by Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 (1895-1990) (Feng 1921). One could also mention an article by
Yu  Shen玉深  (dates  unknown)  about  whether  Indian  women  could  represent  the
oriental civilisation(s) properly (Yu 1923). A brief section of Tokiwa Daijō’s 常盤大定
(1870-1945)  History  of  Indian  Civilisation  (1907)  concerned  with  the  translation  of
Buddhist scriptures in Chinese was also translated in 1920.
18 If we consider books, the situation is also very troubling. While ‘Histories of Chinese
culture’ emerged as a new genre during the 1920s, notably because of Liu Yizheng’s 柳
詒徵 (1880-1956) enterprise (Hon 2004), there is no equivalent publication of ‘Histories
of Indian culture’ in Chinese during the entire Republican era. To my knowledge, only
two books with such titles were published before 1949. And both were translations:
Yindu gudai wenhua 印度古代文化 in 1936, a translation of a book by Takeda Toyoshirō
武田丰四郎  (first  published  in  1925)  and  Yindu  wenhua  shi  印度文化史 in  1948,  a
translation of several texts from A. A. MacDonell. Even among common history books,
one must admit that Indian history was not a heated topic during the May Fourth era.
The first  Chinese  History  of  India17 that  I  have identified in  this  period was again a
translation:  in  1925,  a  certain  Tengzhu  滕柱18 translated  India  by  John  Finnemore
(1863–1915), a general history of India written for the younger public (Tengzhu 1925). It
was followed by Liu Bingrong’s 劉炳榮 (dates unknown) History of India in 192619. Chen
Chalu 陳茶祿 (dates unknown) then published Outline of India’s General History (1928) – a
book that can be considered a milestone in Indian studies, for it was one of the first to
admit that “among the four ancient countries that form the Asiatic wenhua, Babylon,
Persia,  India  and  China,  (…)  only  India  and  China  remained  and  could  nowadays
contribute to the wenhua of the world” (Chen 1928, 1), recognising de facto that India
was also a ‘culture’ worth considering and not simply a ‘lost country’. Yet by consulting
this simple bibliography, it appears that not only was ancient India still vastly unknown
to the general public before Tagore’s visit to China, but during the Republican era much
of the historical and anthropological knowledge on India was accessed via a Western or
Japanese mediation.
19 One should never judge a book by its  cover or a  text  by its  title.  Therefore,  let  us
consider the presence of the expressions Yindu wenhua and Yindu wenming in the full
text of two famous periodicals that have been digitalised: the Shenbao and the Eastern
Miscellany – the second being the most important one for our research, since previous
scholars have already pointed out that it was a publication sensitive to India’s plea in
the modern world. I found in it only three articles mentioning the exact expression
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Yindu wenhua between 1911 and 192420.  They were all published in 1921 – they are a
two-part text by Chen Jiayi discussed below and a text presenting Gandhi, in which it
was simply written that when returning to India in 1895, Gandhi “opposed the Indian
government, and promoted Indian culture by planning to replenish the inner life of the
Indian people”. The article ended on a positive note by saying that Gandhi’s movement
showed  that  Indian  people  could  contribute  to  world  politics  and  world  culture
(W 1921,  34–35)21.  According  to  the  Eastern  Miscellany  database,  the  next  article
containing  the  exact  term  Yindu  wenhua would  only  be  published  in  1937.  Yindu
wenming appears in 11 texts between 1911 and 192522. As such, one cannot say that they
were common expressions. The situation of the Shenbao is even more suggestive, as no
article published in the period here under scrutiny used the term Yindu wenhua. Only
one piece used Yindu wenming, but it is simply a travel note and contains no description
or discussion of what this ‘Indian civilisation/culture’ was (Zhang 1919).
20 The exact  expressions were as  such not very common. If  we open up our scope of
inquiry, and consider all the texts published in the Eastern Miscellany between 1911 and
1925, one finds 280 which feature both Yindu and wenhua. But one faces here the limit of
this lexicometric approach since, in those 280 texts, sometimes the two words were
apart  and  unrelated  to  one  another.  Furthermore,  approaching  the  matter from  a
purely  quantitative  approach  remains  problematic  since  we  lack  any  entry  on  the
meaning and signification of these words in context. As already noted in footnote n°14,
the syntax of the phrases in which those words appear ought to be carefully considered
on a case-by-case basis. Likewise, there are many occurrences where one can read that
India received or adopted a Western wenhua, but it would be an overinterpretation to
consider that because the authors spoke of a Western wenhua, they would necessarily
consider that there also exists an Indian wenhua. After all, around that time, India was
usually depicted as a “half-civilised” country in the Western and Japanese literature.
Besides,  since wenhua was first  understood in the sense of  the universal  concept of
Civilisation with a capital C, and was then progressively associated with the idea of a
West and an East, dividing therefore this universal Civilisation into two hemispheres23,
it is not sure that in linguistics terminology, ‘India’ and ‘the West’ could stand on the
same paradigmatic axis – which means that one could not replace all the occurrences of
‘Western’ with ‘Indian’. Hypothetically, Indian wenhua, as Chinese wenhua, may, after
all, have appeared as a hyponymisation of Eastern wenhua. We should also wonder what
did ‘the West’ mean for a Chinese person at that time, since it was also a very modern
concept in every part of the world (Bavaj 2011).
21 It is therefore important to look into the matter by considering the words within the
argumentative process of the texts. Quantitative analysis can only pinpoint potentially
interesting corpora.  Actually,  one should note  that  the expression Dongfang  wenhua
came up in 16 articles published by the Eastern Miscellany between 1921 and 192224,
while the expression was first used in 1921 in the Shenbao, and was used in some 21
articles before Tagore set foot in China on April 12th, 1924. It is also within this time
frame during which the Eastern Miscellany dedicated one of its special issues to Gandhi,
that Liang Qichao, Liang Shuming and Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (1887-1969) also started to
raise doubt about westernization and promoted Eastern culture(s).  As such, we may
have here a relatively homogenous period for dealing with the question at hand. If
Indian culture was a hyponym of ‘Eastern culture’ or at least a representative (daibiao 
代表) of Eastern culture, we could find here much information regarding the attitude of
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Chinese intellectuals toward India, and the place of the concept of ‘Indian culture’ in
their discourses.
Indian culture: a representative of Eastern culture?
22 As indicated above, there was not much specific presentation or discussion of either
Yindu wenhua or Yindu wenming. However, India was often mentioned as an example in
descriptions  of  Eastern  wenming  or  wenhua.  This  way  of  framing  the  debate  is  not
without problems for our inquiry. As the Chinese language does not mark the plural, it
is often difficult to know whether a text opposes one Western culture/civilisation to
one or several Eastern cultures/civilisations. A few rare indicators can help us to sort
out this problem. For instance, in his article “Western culture and Eastern cultures”
(Dongyang wenhua yu Xifang wenhua 東洋文化與西方文化), the Buddhist Reverend Taixu
太虛  (1890-1947)  wrote  “every  Eastern  culture”  (ge  Dongfang  wenhua 個東方文化)
(Taixu 1924, 1, my emphasis). Nevertheless, most intellectuals were not that sensitive
to this problem of disambiguation.
23 Before considering in detail the early twenties’ tendencies identified previously, let us
first  set  the background by taking a  look at  the two articles  that  Zhu Qianzhi  had
identified as the starting points of the debates over the Eastern and Western cultures,
and see how India fared in them. Chronologically the first text was “The Fundamental
Differences between the Thought of the Peoples of East and West” (Dong Xi minzu genben
sixiang zhi chayi 東西民族根本思想之差異) written by Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 (1879-1942)
and published in 1915. In this text, while using the term “East”, Chen tended to think
first and foremost about China. It is very obvious in his rhetoric when dealing with the




息於天國，印度民族安息於涅槃，安息為東洋諸民族一貫之精神。  (Chen 1915b,
1)
Peoples  of  the  West  privilege  war,  while  peoples  of  the  East  privilege
peaceful livelihood. The Confucians were never eager to fight relentlessly, let
alone go to war; Laozi taught “not to give pride of place to the worthy, so as
not  to  fuel  competition  among  the  people”  and  “to  consider  weapons,
however beautiful, as ominous instruments”. Therefore on Chinese soil since
the Western Han dynasty,  militaristic  and aggressive stances have always
been a great national interdict. The followers of Buddha who were opposed
to killing gave more wind to this degenerating approach. One may say that
the Chinese people find peace in returning to the Earth, the Jewish people
find peace ascending to the Heavenly Kingdom, the Indian people find peace
in  entering  Nirvana.  Searching  for  peace  is  a  common  spiritual  feature
shared by all the peoples of the East.
24 Here  Chen  Duxiu  regarded  the  Chinese,  the  Indians  and  the  Jews  as  Easterners.
However, in listing the peoples of the East, China always came first. Furthermore, its
situation was always explained with more details. Of course, it is obvious that Chen was
more knowledgeable about China. But in the end, the cultural differences between the
various peoples of Asia were simply neglected. Despite this, China and India were both
described as “representatives” of Eastern civilisation; the only topic that mattered to
Chen became the opposition between China and Europe, an opposition that in his mind
overlapped the gap between traditional and modern societies (Cf. Chen 1915, 1). Yet the
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location of India in Chen’s list of examples raises a question: why did he mention the
Jews  before  the  Indians?  If  Chen  spoke  first  of  what  he  knew  best,  this  would  be
surprising.  However,  the  second  text  identified  by  Zhu,  Li  Dazhao’s  “Fundamental
Differences between Eastern and Western Cultures” (Dong Xi wenhua genben zhi yidian 東
西文化根本之異點) – a text famous for democratizing Du Yaquan’s earlier dichotomy
between the West as a “culture/civilisation of activism” (dong zhi wenming 動之文明)
and  the  East  as  a  “culture/civilisation  of  quietism”  (jing  zhi  wenming  靜之文明)
(Cangfu 1916)25 – also put India in a peculiar place. When Li was listing the countries
that  were  members  of  Eastern  civilisation,  India  was  mentioned  after  Indochina,
Malaysia, and Myanmar (Li 1918, 57). Such a position in the lists raises doubt about the
attitude Li and Chen may have had toward India.
25 In addition, a common topic in discussions about Indian culture was its relation with
Chinese culture throughout history26. In the case of Chen Duxiu, he rejected the very
idea that India ever had any influence on China. For him, “the main idea of Indian
doctrines  was  to  depart  from  this  world”,  therefore  “India  neither  inspired  nor
produced  a  fundamental  change  for  the  Chinese  people”  (Chen 1916,  1).  Chen
considered the Indians’ religious beliefs – as any religious beliefs for that matter – to be
stupid  (yu  愚)  and  responsible  for  the  modern  demise  of  India  (Chen 1918,  157).
Whatever one’s opinion on the question of the introduction of Buddhism in China, it
seems to us that Chen’s position was very partial, not to say a caricature. Yet it was far
from being an isolated case; many of the famous intellectuals of the May Fourth era
downplayed  India  and  its  role  in  the  intellectual  history  of  China.  Discussing  the
introduction  of  Buddhism  in  China  often  led  them  to  despise  India  as  a  land  of
religions. In his essay on the “digestion of civilisation” (wenming zhi xiaohua 文明之消
化), Cai Yuanpei stated that the philosophical richness of Indian civilisation had been
stained by the  foul  smell  of  religion (Cai 1916,  416).  For  Cai,  when China “digested
India”, it luckily did not convert to a religious Weltanschauung. Since Cai Yuanpei was
advocating the replacement of “religion with aesthetic education” (Cai 1917),  Indian
culture was an example of what the Chinese should not aspire to. The metaphor of
digestion can also be found in Hu Shi’s 胡適 (1891-1962) writing, notably in his History
of  Chinese  Philosophy,  in  which  he  considered  that  “after  the  Tang  dynasty,  Indian
philosophy progressively became a part of Chinese thought and civilisation” (Hu 1919,
5).  For  Hu  Shi,  China  had  digested  the  Indian  culture  during  the  Six  Dynasties.
Therefore all the good things which the Indians had to offer had been passed on to the
Chinese, while India was left to wither. In the end, the argument largely shared was
that if China took anything from India, it was the best it had ever produced. All the
supposedly negative elements of Indian culture did not cross the border27. It is worth
noting here that Indian culture or its supposed core – be it philosophy or religion – was
irremediably  identified  with  Buddhism.  By  extension,  Indian culture  was  always
discussed  in  terms  of  spiritual  life. It  was  a  common  topos to  note  that  India  had
developed religion or its spiritual civilisation (jingshen wenming 精神文明) and not its
material one (see e.g. Sanwu 1921, 27-28). The focus on religion was negative for most
Chinese, notably the radicals28, but some authors thought differently. For instance, the
importance given to religion in the Indian culture became a positive element for Liu
Yizheng. In his History of Chinese Culture, he claimed that the lack of religious sentiment
was a Chinese weakness that was revealed by the spread of Indian culture in China
(Hon 2015, 86). One should also underline that the discussions about Indian wenhua or 
wenming  and  its  relation  to  China  never  put  forward  the  material  objects  (except
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religious  scriptures)  that  moved  from  one  side  of  the  border  to  the  other;  only
Buddhism reigned. This Buddhism-centred approach to Indian culture also underlines
the fact that debates about India were almost always conducted from the perspective of
Chinese history. Other intellectual traditions such as Brahmanism or Hinduism were
only  mentioned  by  a  few  selective authors;  Islam  was  completely  absent  from  the
debates, as if they had never heard about the Mughal Empire.
26 These remarks being made, let us go back to the major problem of how the conceptual
relation between India and Dongfang wenhua was established. In 1920, Chang Naide 常乃
惪 (1898-1947) produced a summary of what most people used to argue about this topic,
and added his own comments and criticisms. For Chang, civilisation was a universal
process, and it was an error to compare the level of civilisation according to geography.
In  his  mind,  there  was  no  East-West  division  (Chang 1920,  277).  The  problem  was
temporal.  He  therefore  embarked  on  a  criticism  of  the  advocates  of  Eastern




請出東洋文明來補救他的流弊。 (Chang 1920, 269, my emphasis)
First: In the world there are only two civilisations: one is the West, the other
is the East. Second: The fundamental spirits of these two civilisations are in
radical opposition. Third: The sources of Western civilisation are Europe and
America; the sources of Eastern civilisation are China and Japan. Fourth: The end
of the past [i.e. 19 th]  century was the time of Western civilisation apogee.
Now that we can progressively witness its collapse, we should make use of
Eastern civilisation to save it from its shortcomings.
27 In  his  article  Chang  reviewed  these  four  propositions,  but  he  did  not  make  any
comment about India. It was discarded from the picture, as if he had been blind to the
problem, or as if Dongyang was clearly a geographical notion that did not encompass
India. Otherwise, India may have existed on the map of Asia, but it was not even part of
‘civilisation’.  There  is  something  very  unsettling  in  this  Chinese  chauvinistic
appropriation of the whole of Asia or the East, because it was almost never based on
any argument. For both the supporters of “Eastern culture(s)” and their opponents, the
‘East’ often worked as a synonym for China. Furthermore, the transition from one word
to the other was frequently made without any consideration for semantics.  See for
example these two sentences taken from a lecture delivered by Zhang Junmai in 1922:
然東西文化之本末各不同， 如西洋人好言澈底， 中國人好言兼容， 或中庸； 西
洋好界限分明， 中國好言包容。 (Zhang 1922, 122)
From the roots to the branches, Eastern and Western cultures differ from
each  other.  For  example,  the  Westerners  are  good  at  thoroughly
understanding the thing they talk about, while the Chinese like to always
find a common ground – or the golden mean – when talking with others. The
West excels at drawing clear distinctions, China excels at talking in terms of
inclusiveness.
28 Here is an unsubtle shift from the Eastern culture to the Chinese. Zhang’s opposition
between East and West actually boiled down to an opposition between the West and
China. And he was not the only one to do so. Tying the East to China was a figure of
speech  popular  beyond the  political  and  scholarly  discussions.  In  June  1921,  Wang
Guangqi 王光祈 (1892-1936)29 rejoiced that the Germans were interested in the Eastern
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wenhua,  without  ever  mentioning India.  He  limited his  illustrations  to  cultural  and
intellectual venues related to China in Germany (Wang 1921a). Two months later he
would  start  mentioning  India  in  relation  with  the  notion  of  Eastern  wenhua,  by
describing the visit of Tagore in Germany (Wang 1921b). These two articles were later
to be reproduced together in the first issue of Asian Arts and Studies (Yazhou xueshu zazhi
亞洲學術雜志),  giving  to  India  a  semblance  of  participation  to  Eastern  wenhua.
However, in the second issue of the magazine, another article entitled “German Studies
of  Eastern wenhua” (author unknown 1921)  would again only present what German
scholars said about Confucius and Laozi.  There was in the text a brief  reference to
Tagore,  who was associated with Tolstoy (1828–1910),  but  no real  comment on the
study of India.  In fact,  all  the articles published around this time which mentioned
India as a part or as a representative of Eastern wenhua never discussed Indian culture
as  an anthropological  body of  practices,  knowledge and representations that  had a
history. In the context of my reflection here, this goes without saying since my point is
that such a conception of culture would be anachronistic. But at the same time one
needs to insist on the fact that they had no interest for what traditional Indian literati
were doing either. Whatever the meanings wenhua was to purport at that time, Indian
wenhua was regarded as useless if not sterile. When Chinese intellectuals spoke about
India, it was only to channel Tagore’s wish for the Asian to be heard by the Westerners.
They endorsed his general position, but rarely discussed in detail what he was saying
about India, nor the very arguments he put forward30.
29 As a matter of fact, Indian wenhua had no place in the debates of the time because it was
rhetorically  scrapped.  Chen Jiayi’s  陳嘉異  (dates  unknown)  very  academic31 article,
“Eastern culture and our [historical] responsibility” (Dongfang wenhua yu wuren zhi daren
東方文化與吾人之大任) published in 1921, offers an insight into how the rhetorical
disappearance of India operated. After having surveyed a series of definitions of what
culture (wenhua 文化) is, Chen declared that he would speak about Eastern culture in
regard to the Chinese nation. It was therefore to be expected that India was not to have
an important place in his text, despite the affirmation that again “China and India were
both representatives for contemporary Oriental culture” (Chen 1921, n°1,  20).  In his
text,  Chen shed light  on  four  features  of  Oriental  cultures  (the  term is  apparently
considered as a plural), but here again the reasoning was fallacious. The four points he
put forward almost always dismissed India. We do not need to enter in his arguments,
but simply note how he adjusted his speech. In the first section he writes, “Eastern
culture (this section concerns especially China)” (Dongfang wenhua (ci zhuan jiu Zhongguo
yan) 東方文化(此專就中國言) (Chen 1921, n°1, 21), in the second “Eastern culture (this
section can also be somewhat valid for India)” (Dongfang wenhua (ci lüe jian Yindu yan) 東
方文化(此略兼印度言)) (Chen 1921, n°1, 28), in the third “Eastern culture (this section
also concerns only China)” (Dongfang wenhua (ci yi dan jiu Zhongguo yan) 東方文化(此亦
單就中國言)) (Chen 1921, n°2, 9),  and in the fourth again “The Eastern culture (this
section can also be somewhat valid for India)” (Dongfang wenhua (ci lüe jian Yindu yan) 東
方文化(此略兼印度言))  (Chen 1921,  n°2,  14).  Also,  when  a  specific  point  somehow
concerned India, he did not give any corresponding example. To him, only the Chinese
culture was important, the Indian was not even discussed. Chen was completely aware
that he described Dongfang wenhua in a manner that would not be appropriate for India,
but that did not lead him to add any remark in his text. Neither did commentators on
this text raise this point (see for instance Jiangu 1921).
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30 A few years later, Chen would renew his plea in favour of Dongfang wenhua and the
academic  societies  whose  goal  was  to  study  it.  Once  again,  India  would  be  almost
completely absent from his discourse. Affirming that China is the only old country that
succeeded in maintaining the historical continuity of its culture, Chinese wenhua was,
according to him, “the outstanding [figure] of Eastern culture” (Dongfang wenhua zhi
qiaochu 東方文化之翹楚) (Chen 1924; 1). But this time, interestingly enough, he had a
few comments on India:
印度文化。以佛教思想為最高。而佛教大乘精義又惟中國為獨得。是則保存佛典
闡明佛教。實吾國應有之責。(Chen 1924, 7)
Buddhist thought is the most elevated element of Indian culture; yet,  the
quintessence of the Greater Vehicle was only attained by China alone.  As
such  the  conservation  of  the  Buddhist  canon  and  the  promotion  of  the
Buddhist doctrine ought to be our country’s responsibility.
31 Despite  not  being  a  famous  intellectual  figure,  Chen  Jiayi’s  case  is  here  quite
emblematic  as  he  played  an  instrumental  role  in  the  “Society  for  Eastern  Culture
Studies”  (Dongfang  wenhua  xueshe  東方文化學社).  This  society  which  aimed  at
“organising”  (zhengli  整理)  and  “disseminating”  (xuanchuan  宣傳)  Eastern  wenhua 
(author unknown 1924a) was officially established in 1924, but the idea for its inception
emerged around 1922 (Luo 1924, 1)32. Intellectual societies and institutions whose goal
was to promote Eastern wenhua started to become quite common around that time.
Liang Qichao for instance opened an “Institute for Oriental Culture” at the University of
Nankai (Tianjin) in 192233. But when one considers the teachers who instructed at this
institute,  one  finds  no  specialists  on  India  (see  the  news  about  the  Institute  in
Editor 1922a and 1922b)34. In the case of Chen’s “Society for Eastern Culture Studies”,
the denegation of India is almost assumed. In an official document describing the goal
and the organisation of the society, Luo Zhengwei 羅正緯 (1848-1951) wrote:
現在要推我國為最高。因爲東方文化的代表。本事中國和印度兩派。但是印度到
了中世紀以後。文化衰歇。(Luo 1924, 4)35
Now we need to push China to the foreground, because, despite the fact that
China and India are both representatives of Eastern culture, India’s culture
declined after the medieval period.
32 The founding declaration of the association made no reference to India except for one
sentence:  “Indian  knowledge  (xueshu  學術)  was  concentrated  in  Chan 
Buddhism” (author unknown 1924b, 11). As such, it is not simply the so-called radicals
of the New culture that despised Indian culture; numerous scholars that have been up
to now designated as the “Eastern culture clique” (Dongfang wenhua pai 東方文化派)
also had strong doubts about what India could offer to the world culturally speaking.
The only intellectuals  who positively evaluated India were often the Buddhists,  but
here again it was also considered that Chinese Buddhism was superior to India’s. In
their minds, India had already played its historical role when it passed on Buddhism to
China, and now the quintessence of its culture was being expressed in a more elegant
and sophisticated manner by the Chinese. Such line of reasoning is clearly similar to
what Okakura Kakuzō had already put forward in his Ideals of the East when he wrote
that  Japan  was  “the  real  repository  of  the  trust  of  Asiatic  thought  and  culture”
(Okakura 1903, 5). The Indian and Chinese pasts had served as historical referents for
the  Japanese  in  their  attempt  to  build  a  new  cultural  narrative.  When  they  were
negatively considered, they were simply rejected as hurdles to modernization. When
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they were considered as positive; it was believed that the Japanese had taken the best
of it and had magnified it36. India’s role in the Chinese narrative was quite similar.
33 As  such,  the  promotion  of  “Eastern  culture”  in  order  to  save  the  West  from  the
bankruptcy of its  civilisation was not considered as a global  process.  It  was mainly
China’s mission to save the West, and by extension the world. Eastern culture did not
mean  ‘Chinese  culture  and  Indian  culture’  but  ‘Chinese  culture  and  Indian  culture
within  Chinese  culture’.  Mentioning  Tagore  or  even  Gandhi  was  but  a  means  to
strengthen the legitimacy of the Chinese own critique of the West. It seems that their
positions regarding the fact that India also had something to give to the West were
never  seriously  discussed,  and therefore  probably  not  even considered.  Yet,  before
concluding, one should give one more chance to the possibility of India being culturally
favoured by  some prominent  Chinese  intellectuals  and consider  the  special  case  of
Liang Shuming.
Liang Shuming: an advocate of Indian culture?
34 At a time when the East-West dichotomy was monopolising the intellectual field, one
book changed,  or  at  least  tried  to  change,  the  framework.  In  1921,  Liang Shuming
published a volume in which the West, China and India were apparently put on the
same level. In the words of Thierry Meynard, “Liang challenged the myth of a so-called
Oriental  culture  that  placed  China  at  the  centre  and  India  on  the  periphery”
(Meynard 2011, 31).  The publication of Liang Shuming’s Cultures of  East and West and
Their  Philosophies  (Dong Xi  wenhua ji  qi  zhexue  東西文化及其哲學)  in  1921 was a  key
moment in the history of the cultural debates. Cai Yuanpei did not hesitate to write
that “Liang Shuming’s book had raised the most important problems in contemporary
philosophical debates” (Cai 1923, 381). It was the first – and perhaps only37 – book to
seriously put India, China and the West in a tripartite comparative framework. Liang
Shuming’s thesis was highly debated, and attracted many attacks and criticisms38.
35 The core of Liang’s book can be summed up as follows39: for Liang, every culture, like
every life, anchors itself in a fundamental will (yiyu 意欲). This will can be oriented in
different directions (Liang Shuming 1921, 352). Facing the problems of life, man can
either “go forward”, “adjust his own intention”, or “turn back and move backwards”
(Liang 1921,  381–382).  Besides,  Liang  notes  that  life  takes  place  in  three  different
realms: the material (wuzhi 物質), the social (shehui 社會), and the spiritual (jingshen 精
神) (Liang 1921, 379–381). This typology starts off his approach toward Indian, Chinese
and Western cultures. They are all distinguished by attitudes toward the world. With its
will  to go forward, the West has focused its culture on the material world; Chinese
culture with its will oriented toward harmony (tiaohe 調和) epitomizes the adjustment
of one’s intention in the social world; finally, Indian culture turns its back to the world
and addresses the problems of the spirit. For Liang, “the vast majority of Indians do not
want  to  preserve  their  lives,  they  usually  want  to  leave  the  world – they  call  it
nirvāna”  (Liang 1921,  436–437)40. Furthermore,  each  culture  is  built  on  a  different
philosophical  system. “The life  of  the West consists  in that  intuition applies to the
intellect; the life of China consists of the intellect applying to intuition; the life of India
consists  of  the  intellect  as  it  applies  to  direct  sensation”  (Liang 1921,  378–380,
Wesolowski’s translation slightly modified).
36 In Liang’s understanding, Eastern cultures were not lagging behind Western modernity.
They  simply  took  a  different  path.  He  even  turned  upside  down  the  thesis  of  the
backwardness of Eastern cultures: for him, they were advanced or literally “ripe too
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early”  (zaoshu  早熟)  (Liang 1921,  526).  China  and  India  had  tried  to  address  the
problems of  society and spirit  before solving the material  necessities of  life.  In the
short term, Liang therefore called for a cultural reorientation: China ought to focus
herself on the material world – i.e. adopt Western culture. But once the material life is
comfortable enough, China will have to go back to its own cultural trajectory41. Finally,
in the future, when both the material and social problems are handled, China will have
to walk the Indian path and solve the spiritual problems. In Liang’s eyes, Indian culture
was therefore not appropriate for the present time (Liang 1921, 528), but one day, it
would be. From this perspective, Liang did not belittle Indian culture. On the contrary,
India was located at a nexus in Liang’s soteriological discourse: ultimately, it will free
the whole of mankind from spiritual suffering42. However, let us enter into the details
and observe what Liang’s Indian ‘culture’ really was.
37 Thierry Meynard noted that Liang’s “culturalist approach led [him] to assign religion
the central role within his three cultures: the social religion of Christianity in the West,
the psychological and moral religion of Confucianism in China, and the transcendent
religion  in  India”  (Meynard 2011,  37).  But  in  the  case  of  India,  it  is  not  just  any
transcendent religion: it is only Buddhism. In fact, in Liang’s writing, India’s culture
would be better described as “an Indo-(weishi-)  Buddhist  culture” (Wesolowski 2005,
380).  Liang  only  spoke  about  Buddhism,  and  he  considered  it  mostly  through  a
Vijñānavāda  perspective43.  Once  again  earlier  Indian  systems  of  thought  were
disregarded, and Islam was again completely omitted.
38 In 1922,  some reviewers had already raised problems with this  way of  framing the
issue. Although most of them did not give their opinion on what Liang had said about
India because they considered themselves not qualified enough to make critiques on
this matter, Li Shicen 李石岑 (1892-1934) hit the nail on the head when he wrote that
Liang  was  producing  too  many  reductions  in  his  presentation  of  India  as  well  as
Buddhism: “Vijñānavāda is  neither the totality of  Indian culture nor the totality of
Indian philosophy” (Li 1922,  494).  According to him, Liang conflated and put in the
same basket “religion”, “Buddhism” and “India” (Li 1922, 502). For Zhang Dongsun 張東
蓀 (1886-1973), Cultures of East and West was not a book that compared cultures, it was a
work of comparative philosophy (Zhang 1922, 482). Zhang Dongsun’s remark here is a
breath of fresh air because, for once, it does not hesitate to spell out the problem. All
the debates around wenhua in the early twenties were not concerned with the modern
anthropological concept of “culture” – hence the embarrassment in translating wenhua.
They  often  tend  to  condense  these  so-called  cultures  into  a  limited  number  of
phenomena, usually religion and/or philosophy. But even in this context, and even if
wenhua did not mean culture or civilisation, how can we explain that Liang Shuming, a
professor  of  Indian  philosophy  at  Beijing  University,  could  only  associate  Indian
philosophy to Buddhism? Did he not have any knowledge of the six traditional Indian
schools?
39 Actually, Liang knew of these schools for he had presented them in his Outline of Indian
Philosophy (Liang 1919).  However,  once  again,  it  is  obvious  that  his  book  had  been
written  from  the  perspective  of  a  Buddhist,  since  he  described  them  as  “heretical
paths” (waidao 外道). Furthermore, he preferred calling them “philosophical religions”
(zhexue de zongjiao 哲學的宗教) (Liang Shuming 1919, 60). For him, “Indian schools were
to be understood as religions, with the religious quest coming first” (Meynard 2011, 43).
Liang’s understanding of Indian philosophy was only partial but as rightly noted by
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Meynard,  the  “Outline  of  Indian  Philosophy antecedes  both  the  modern  research  on
Indian  philosophy,  and  the  modern  editions  of  Indian  texts.  Therefore,  we  cannot
expect Liang’s research to meet modern standards of scholarship” (Meynard 2011, 72).
As such, like all his contemporaries, Liang considered the importance of religion as the
most  distinctive  feature  of  Indian  culture.  But  he  reduced  the  religious  life  of  the
Indians to Buddhism.
40 Considered  from  the  tripartite  framework,  Liang’s  attitude  toward  India  may  have





活各方面又為宗教的畸形發達，這實在特別古怪之至 !  (Liang 1921,  393,  my
emphasis)
Let us take a look at [Indian culture]: its material civilisation has produced
no achievements, and its social life has not known any evolution; [in this
respect] it does not attain Western standards or even China’s. In its culture
there  is  nothing  to  talk  about.  Its  only  accomplishment  is  religion.  And  its
philosophy, literature, sciences, and arts all  depend on it.  As to the three
realms of life, it has produced a twisted development of its spiritual life, and
among the many aspects of spiritual life, it also had a warped advancement
toward religion. This is really awkward!
41 Despite the fact that Liang had saved India from the East-West dichotomy, his attitude
toward  it  ultimately  shared  much  with  his  contemporaries;  his  Indian  culture  was
Buddhism-centred, and his Buddhism Vijñānavāda-centred. For him there was nothing
to discuss in India aside from that. Liang was not interested in an anthropological study
of India; the only ‘Indian culture’ he spoke about was in fact a part of what India had
transmitted to China. One might have expected a more balanced view from someone
who taught Indian philosophy at Beijing University. But in the end he only spoke of
essentialised and uprooted Western, Chinese and Indian philosophies that could fit into
his model.
Conclusion
42 In sum, it appears that ‘Indian culture’ (under the token Yindu wenhua) was not yet an
operative  concept  in  Chinese  intellectual  discourse  during  the  May  Fourth  era44.
Understood  from  an  emic  point  of  view,  the  value  of  Indian  culture  was  always
downplayed,  or  at  best  ignored.  Although Tagore’s,  and to a  lesser  extent  Gandhi’s
culturalist discourses started to be heard in China, their positions regarding how India
could  save  the  West  from  its  own  demise  were  hardly  listened  to.  Chinese
neoconservative thinkers brought them forward as critics of the West, but the Western
sickness was only to be cured by the Chinese antidote. When affirming that Eastern
culture could offer salvation to the world, they did not use the term ‘Eastern culture’
(Dongfang wenhua 東方文化) as an embodiment of both China and India. It was often but
a synonym for Chinese culture only. India was rhetorically excluded from the Chinese
debates on the cultures of East and West.
43 It seems that the richness of the Indian past did not capture the interest of Chinese
intellectuals, except for Buddhism. Texts and discussions about other Indian traditions
and practices were very difficult to be found in publications addressed to an educated
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but general audience. This Buddhism-centred approach to the question was probably
motivated by the religious beliefs of the actors in question – most of the scholars who
dedicated a part of their work to Buddhism or to how Buddhism came into China were
Buddhists – but one can also wonder whether this focus was not a means to reflect on
contemporary  Western  cultural  transfers  with  reference  to  a  historical  precedent.
Simultaneously, one may wonder whether Chinese intellectuals were not following the
examples of some Japanese thinkers, such as Okakura Kakuzō who regarded his own
country as the producer of the quintessence of Asian culture. It  is an idea that, for
instance, lurks behind Chen Jiayi’s texts. Chinese intellectuals were appropriating the
whole East.
44 Yet,  one should go beyond the simple  acknowledgment that  Indian culture  was  no
object of inquiry for the Chinese intellectuals. The elements presented in this article
should  invite  us  to  reconsider  what  the  Chinese  meant  by  Yindu  wenhua  and  even
wenhua alone in regards to the usages of these words. If one agrees with Wittgenstein
that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Wittgenstein 2010, 43), one
should  perhaps  reframe  one’s  understanding  of  these  words  through  Chinese
discourses and not  the other way around.  The relative absence of  discussion about
ancient  India  using  the  term  wenhua,  compared  to  the  overwhelming  presence  of
Tagore, may inform us that this word had not at that time a historical ethnographic
component.  Within  this  context,  speaking  about  wenhua  necessarily  meant
participating in contemporary-oriented speech.
45 Likewise,  it  may  be  a  little  too  hasty  to  criticise  the  Chinese  intellectuals  in  their
limitation of Indian wenhua to Buddhism. If such a proposition sounds very reductive, if
not utterly false,  when used by any 21st century writer,  maybe Yindu wenhua really
meant Buddhism in the early twenties; it is simply that wenhua ought not be translated
as our contemporary ‘culture’. Let us keep in mind that translation operates between
languages but also between time periods. Let us imagine: what if Liang Shuming was
right in his description of India? The following lines may seem like unnecessary word
parsing, but what if wenhua was not at that time a stabilized lexeme (wenhua) but more
of a syntagma: wen-hua, a “transformation (hua) through patterns or texts (wen)”? What
if for a phenomenon to be named a wenhua, it were necessary that it had produced a
transformation of China? We would need a wen, understood as texts, ritual practices,
arts, patterns, etc., that would hua – transform positively – China. Through this reading,
one could logically  admit  that  Indian wenhua was only Buddhism. Indian Buddhism
changed  the  face  of  China,  not  Brahmanism,  Vedic  literature,  or  anything  anyone
would locate behind the contemporary phrase ‘Indian culture’. Although it is laid out in
oversimplified terms, this very China-centred reading hypothesis is worth considering;
for,  as  we  have  just  shown,  Chinese  discussions  of  ‘Eastern  culture’  were  already
Chinese-centred. India was discussed from the point of view of what China had refined
of it. Maybe Liang Shuming was right: Yindu wenhua was really Buddhism. The corollary
of this reasoning would, however, set a real and more provocative challenge to Chinese
intellectual  history.  What  if,  by  the  same  logic,  Xifang  wenhua  was  not  “Western
culture”, but only the Western “patterns” (wen 文) one could import to transform (hua 
化)  Chinese  society  or  grammatically  more  correct  “a  transformation  by  Western
patterns” – science, democracy and so on? In this regard, one should remember that if
Xifang wenhua was a term used to describe a world far away, it also designated a real
presence in city-ports and international settlements: entire series of Western patterns
were already on Chinese soil, only waiting to conquer the whole country. Furthermore,
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when we say that Chinese intellectuals wanted to import Western culture,  did they
really want to have it all or simply the relevant parts that would restore China to its
superior ‘rightful’ place?
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NOTES
1. Laurence Schneider wrote that at the end of the 19th century Chinese scholars discovered
“culture”  (guocui  國粹)  as  “a  special  body  of  native  literature  and  art  as  a  thing-in-itself,
independent of and even more fundamental than the political and even social institutions which
until then had been intimately associated with it” (Schneider 1976, 57). However, during the 20th
century this word was to be replaced by another neologism: wenhua 文化. Wenhua was at first a
synonym of wenming and was often used to translate “civilisation” (see e.g. A Modern Dictionary of
the English Language Translated into Chinese 1913, 114). However, it soon gained its independence
and denoted the modern anthropological notion of culture. Despite not being totally satisfying
regarding  the  methodology  (see  in  comparison  the  Korean  case  studied  by  Kim 2015),  a
description of the emergence of wenhua in contrast with wenming was documented by Fang 2003
and Huang 2006 & 2011. Yet, a clear explanation of the often-mentioned transition from guocui to
wenhua (e.g. Liu 1995 or Hon 2003) remains to be given. In studies concerned with ancient China,
wen 文 has often been understood in the sense of culture/civilisation. However the meanings
encompassed by this character included a broader semantic field. Its uses were also not the same.
When we translate wen into “culture”, we not only translate from one language to another, but
we also bring a term from a bygone time in the language and the cognitive categories of ours. In
his history of the concept of culture and civilisation in the West, Jorg Fisch spoke of “culture
without the concept of culture” (Kultur ohne Kulturbegriff) when he expanded on the Greek notion
of παιδεία (Fisch 1992, 682–683). It is my belief that one could also say that the ancient Chinese
had what we would call (from an etic point of view) a culture or a civilisation, but not a concept
to express it in its modern form (an emic point of view). Culture, as well as ‘civilisation’ are after
all very modern political notions – basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) in a koselleckian sense – whose
destiny is connected to many concepts of the European Sattelzeit  such as ‘history’,  ‘progress’,
‘state’ or ‘nation’. See also Bénéton 1975 on the Western history of these concepts. In his study of
Bengal “culturalism”, Sartori went to the extent of affirming that “the history of the culture
concept in Bengal [could] be treated neither as a local deviation from, nor as a late reiteration of,
an  essentially  Western  intellectual  form”;  he  proposed  to  investigate  it  “as  a  spatially  and
temporally  specific  moment  in  the  global  history  of  the  culture  concept”  (Sartori 2008,  5).
Despite this, he rejected the perspective of considering ‘culture’ simply as an importation from
the West; he nonetheless regarded it as a very modern and globalized concept that “articulated a
claim  about  the  fundamental  ‘underdeterminedness’  of  human  subjectivity – the  freedom  of
subjectivity  from  determinations  of  objective  necessity  such  as  biology,  nature,  economy  or
society” (Sartori 2008, 21) and was therefore a clear product of modernity.  The same remark
could apply in the case of China. 
2. Cf. Geng 2002; Shimada 1990, 76–83; Liu 2008 & 2012; see also Nicolas Idier’s contribution to the
present volume. Wang 2007 is perhaps the only research that has tried so far to thread together
in  a  book several  studies  concerning  the  attitude  of  some Chinese  intellectuals  and authors
toward India. One should note that Kang, Liang and Zhang are usually the only authors studied
regarding  this  topic  at  the  beginning  of  the  20th century  (people  such  as  Ma Xulun  馬叙倫
(1885-1970) who, for instance, translated from Japanese several texts on Indian religions has been
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disregarded so far; Su Manshu’s 蘇曼殊 (1884-1918) work is only discussed by Wang 2007, 159–
176).  The  conclusions  of  these  studies  always  point  toward the  ambivalent  attitude  of  these
writers; on the one hand, they praised Indian culture, while, on the other hand, they elaborated
India as a political counter-example. 
3. Concerning Tagore’s trip see notably Hay 1970 and the more nuanced Das 2005. On Tagore’s
reception in China cf. Zhang 1994. Despite it being a failure, Tagore’s journey to China was to
open  a  series  of  new  interactions  between  India  and  China  such  as  Tan  Yunshan’s譚雲山 
(1898-1983) participation in the Cheena Bhavana in Santiniketan (studied by Tsui 2010) or the
lesser-known visit of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888–1975) to China in 1944. Recently Tagore has
become  a  topic  privileged  by  Indian  and  Chinese  scholars  in  their  desire  to  reconsider  the
relation  between the  two countries,  see  notably  Tan 2011.  Yet,  one  may  wonder  if  scholars
participating in this dynamic have not sometimes exaggerated the impact of Tagore in China to
promote a political agenda. 
4. See notably the collection of articles compiled by Chen 1985. As early as the Republican era,
Chinese intellectuals were clearly aware of the ongoing controversies. In 1923, Du Yaquan 杜亞泉
(1873-1933) was already publishing a collection of articles titled Criticizing the cultures of East and
West  (Piping  Dong  Xi  wenhua  批評東西文化) (Cangfu 1923).  In  1935,  Zhu  Qianzhi  朱謙之
(1899-1972) also identified a “question over the cultures of East and West” that emerged around
1915 (Zhu 1935, 1).
5. This affirmation should, however, be nuanced in the research dealing with Liang Shuming who
gave much thought to the Indian culture problem (see below). 
6. After all, Okakura Kakuzō 岡倉覚三 (1863-1913) had coined in 1903 the famous sentence “Asia
is  one”  (Okakura  1903,  1),  and  around  the  same  time  Asianism  and  Pan-Asianism  became
important  political  projects  that  hoped  to  foster  an  Asian  transnational  cooperation  while
insisting on socio-cultural traits shared by the Asians. This dynamic was notably important in
Japan where intellectuals coming from the four corners of the continent could meet. Yet one
should  probably  keep  distinct  the  discussions  about  Asia  that  fall  into  the  category  of
regionalism, and the debates over the East-West dichotomy. While the East-West dichotomy was
largely inherited from the Western Orientalism postulate of an almost ontological division of the
world into two cultural hemispheres – a division that would also overlap with the ‘Self’/‘Other’
and  ‘Dominant’/‘Dominated’  dichotomies  produced  by  a  colonial  West  –  Asianism  emerged
through a progressive enlargement of ‘Asian cooperation’. Except for people like Okakura, it is
legitimate to say that India really entered in the Asianism discourse in the late 1910s, early 1920s
(cf. Saaler 2011; Weber 2018, 110). Before that time, Asianism was mainly built on the affirmation
that the Chinese,  the Japanese and the Koreans,  and sometimes the Vietnamese,  embodied a
“shared race” (Tongzu 同族) and possessed “shared writings or patterns” (Tongwen 同文); even in
later periods the question of the unifying link between those three (or four) countries would
remain at the core of Asianism discourses. Since I could not find any Chinese discussion about an
“Asian culture”  (Yazhou or  Yaxiya  wenhua/wenming)  that  would include specific  comments  on
India,  the  Asianist  dimension  of  the  subject  will  be  set  aside  in  this  article.  Furthermore,
although they made random references to India, the most important Asianist Chinese pleas (Li
Dazhao 1919 and Sun 1924) had no use for the concept of wenhua in a geographic or national
sense –  Sun 1924 used only once the expression “Eastern civilisation of  China” (Zhongguo de
Dongfang wenming 中國的東方文明) – and their remarks about India remained strictly political.
Sun Yat-sen employed mostly the term wenhua as a way of behaving in the political realm when 
he opposed a “kingly culture” (wangdao wenhua 王道文化) to a “hegemon culture” (badao wenhua
霸道文化); on Sun’s Asianism, see Weber 2018, 198-207. 
7. One needs to note here that there are many different ways to express the idea of ‘the East’ in
Chinese characters. The two most common expressions are Dongfang 東方 and Dongyang 東洋. We
could be tempted to use them as synonyms, but they seem to have different uses in Asia. If the
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Chinese mostly favored the first expression, the Japanese used more frequently the latter (Tōyō 
東洋)  –  Stefan Tanaka even considered Tōyō  to  be  “essentially  a  twentieth-century  Japanese
concept”  (Tanaka  1993,  4).  However,  aside  from  a  brief  description  of  the  meaning  of  the
characters  used in the compound –  fang  evoking “orientation” while  yang would be “ocean/
vastness” – the genuine difference between the two terms has never been, to my knowledge,
questioned in the academic literature. In China, since Dongyang originally served as a toponym –
the territories of the Eastern Sea, i.e. Japan (Chen 2001, 370) – it often kept this connotation (for a
general presentation of the semantic history of Dongyang/Tōyō, see Saitō 2005, pp. 43-77). As the
most famous pro-West Japanese intellectuals of the Meiji era wished to distinguish Japan from
Tōyō, one can however wonder whether using the word Dongfang may have not been a tactical
move of the Chinese to bring Japan back in an ‘Eastern frame’. 
8. Such a phenomenon is also noticeable in Japan. Despite the claim that Tōyō meant “that which
was not the Occident” (Tsuda Sokichi quoted by Tanaka 1993, 4), histories concerned with the
East often dealt mainly about China, and Japan’s relationship with it – a point partly admitted by
Tsuda himself  when he noted that for the Sinophiles the “so-called Tōyō  is  primarily China”
(Tanaka 1993, 5). In fact, the concept of Tōyō was profoundly connected to the debates regarding
the historical relation of Japan to China, the former centre of the world (Chūgoku 中国)  now
considered  through  the  new  appellation  of  Shina  支那 (Chen  2001).  As  such,  it  helped  the
Japanese in the creation of “their modern identity” (Tanaka 1993, 11). While Japan tended to
distance itself from a China-centred worldview in order to join with the Western great powers,
China was inevitably linked to the idea of an “inferior Orient”. On the contrary, for the Chinese,
the  notion  of  ‘the  Orient’  may  have  served  positively  as  a  means  to  reinvent  their  former
centrality.  By assimilating China to Donfang they probably unconsciously traded their former
world-centrality for an Eastern-centrality in a bipolar system. 
9. The  role  of  academic  institutions  and the  emergence  of  specific  scientific  fields  in  which
positive  knowledge  about  other  countries,  peoples  and  cultures  are  formulated  cannot  be
overlooked. As a matter of fact, although discourses on Indian culture were not at first produced
by academics, it is they who gave it a historical authenticity. This situation is quite comparable to
the case of Japan, where discourses on the Orient were intrinsically linked to the constitution of
the scientific discipline ‘Eastern history’ (Tōyōshi  東洋史)  (cf.  Tanaka 1993).  Regarding earlier
modern Chinese scholars who worked on their own on Indian texts, see the article by T.H. Barrett
“The Early Modern Origins of Chinese Indology” in the present volume. 
10. See his works on the subject collated in the 14th volume of the Yinbingshi heji 飲冰室合集 of
1936.
11. Li spoke of India using the traditional term Tianzhu 天竺. I have, however, never encountered
an  author  speaking  of  Tianzhu  guocui  天竺國粹,  Tianzhu  wenming 天竺文明 or  even  Tianzhu
wenhua 天竺文化. 
12. See a detailed list in Zhang 1994 (205–230) 
13. I have unfortunately not succeeded in identifying the original document in the Collected works
of Gandhi (Gandhi 1999).
14. In his text, Teng uses the formula “in the history of Indian culture”; however, if we consider
the Chinese – zai Yindu de wenhua shi shang 在印度的文化史上 (Teng 1921, 63) – the determinative
of  the  syntagma  is  “history”  (shi  史),  while  the  subordination  between  “cultural”  or
“civilisational history” and India is a loose form of junction. There is a subtle difference between
Yindu wenhua  and Yindu zhi  wenhua  (or  with  the  use  of  any form of  de 的/地):  “Without  de,
modifier  and  head  are  in  close  junction,  presenting  the  modifying  notion  as  an  inbuilt
characteristic” (Wiedenhof 2016). A systematic study of this problem ought to be conducted, but
as of now, it appears to me that in the literature I have browsed so far, when an author referred
to ‘Indian culture’ as a historical and anthropological collective category – the third category of
culture  in  Jenks’s  typology  (Jenks 2005,  11–12),  i.e. culture  as  generally  confused  with
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‘civilisation’ – they always preferred Yindu wenhua. Yindu zhi wenhua can generally be understood
as the Indian version of  the universal  phenomenon of  culture.  However,  there is  no general
solution, and one should better proceed with a hermeneutical text by text approach. 
15. I proceeded here in two stages. First, I looked for these words in titles of articles published by
relying on the 1833–1949 Chinese Periodical  Full-text  Databases (Wan Qing qikan Minguo shiqi  qikan
quanwen  shuju  ku晚清期刊、民国时期期刊全文数据库)  developed  by  the  Shanghai  Library 
(available at http://www.cnbksy.cn/). Then I looked into the texts by searching in full two key
periodicals of  the time: the Shenbao and the Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi  東方雜志).  The
choice of these publications was justified not only by the fact that they are easily accessible, but
also because they presented themselves as mainstream journals with an important circulation.
Since the aim of this article is to inquire into the place of ‘Indian culture’ in the intellectual
debates about cultural diversity, my problem was not to identify lesser-known and hardly read
periodicals written only for specialists. Furthermore I should clarify that the full-text research
on the Eastern Miscellany was realized through the website www.cpem.cp.com.cn, a website not
specifically designed for this type of research. In fact, it is obvious that the numbers given below
are not exact since I found texts during my research that employed the term Yindu de wenhua and
were not in the statistics of the website (for instance Teng 1921); it seems that the website does
not  consider  junction particles  such as  de  的  or  zhi  之.  Therefore,  the numbers  given below
should be taken with precaution and only be used to indicate a general tendency. They do not
give a precise factual description of the presence of these words in the literature of the time.
16. Under this term the author referred to the museums, the libraries and the research centres
established by the British. 
17. As mentioned in the introduction, at the end of the Qing dynasty, histories of India as a ‘lost
country’ existed, but these books mainly focused on how India was defeated. By “histories of
India” I refer here to books that were concerned with the history of this country/continent in the
longue durée,  or  what we could be tempted to call  broad histories of  Indian civilisation from
antiquity to the time of their authors. To give a comparison, such books could already be found in
Japan: Takakuwa 1903 had known many reeditions under several titles; see also Tokiwa 1907 and
Shigematsu 1915. This last book dedicated its second half to the ‘culture’ (bunka 文化) of ancient
India (pp. 57-109) but the term obviously did not mean “culture” in a modern anthropological
sense, as it was specifically concerned with Brahmanic philosophy and scientific knowledge as
well as literature in Sanskrit. Takakuwa 1903 had also already several sections dealing with Indo
bunka 印度文化  in the sense of knowledge and sciences.  The case of the historian Takakuwa
Komakichi  高桑駒吉 (1869-1927)  is  furthermore  fascinating  because  he  was  the  writer  of
numerous history books dedicated to the “cultural or civilisational histories” (bunmeishi 文明史 
or bunkashi 文化史) of the West, the East, Japan, China and India. He moreover included India in
his conception of the East. However, he is a figure still completely unknown to the academia; and
one may have doubt on whether his writings may have circulated among Chinese intellectuals:
his History of Chinese culture would be discussed by several Chinese historians around 1926 (it was
even translated into Chinese) but I could not find any Chinese comments on his works concerned
with India.
18. Since there were not that many specialists on India at that time, I suspect that Tengzhu may
have been a pen name of Teng Ruoqu, mentioned above. 
19. In his preface, Liu advocated that Indian history ought to be studied by the Chinese since
both countries had shared an important part of history: “Speaking from the point of view of
culture, [one must say] that China and India have a particularly close relationship” (Liu 1926, 1).
20. In comparison, there were 37 occurrences of Zhongguo wenhua and 47 of Xifang wenhua. 
21. Almost all the articles in this special issue about Gandhi used both the word India and wenhua,
but only W. reunited them in the expression Yindu zhi wenhua. It is also worth noting that the
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word wenhua was much used, at that time, in the translation of Tagore (e.g. Ziyi 1922). It was a
term oriented toward the contemporaneous. 
22. In comparison there were 23 occurrences of Zhongguo wenming and 34 of Xifang wenming. The
lesser  amount  of  “country+wenming” phrases  compared  to  “country+wenhua”  illustrates  the
progressive transition from wenming to wenhua in the cultural vocabulary. 
23. At least that seems to be the case in China, but simultaneously one needs to point out the fact
that Africa, the Middle East or South America were often absent of the picture. As such the sum
of the East and the West didn’t necessarily amount to the totality of the planet. When Easterners
spoke of the East, they mainly referred to themselves in a national sense. Furthermore, one can
conjecture that in their understanding of the world, there were peoples and countries that did
not even belong to Civilisation. If the Japanese, the Chinese and the Indians were all fighting
against the label of “semi- or half- civilised countries”, and considered themselves as “civilised”,
they did not necessarily believe that their non-Western neighbours shared this adjective, and
even  at  times  relegated  them  to  the  categories  of  “half-civilised”  or  “barbaric”.  Fukuzawa
Yukichi 福澤 諭吉 (1935-1901), for instance, adhered to the idea that India and China were only
half-civilised, an idea that should in his opinion encourage Japan to take its distance from Asia.
Furthermore some intellectuals from all around the world dreamt of a synthesis of the East and
West,  an intellectual  move that clearly implied that those notions went far beyond a simple
problem of geography. 
24. Dongyang wenhua was also used in four additional articles during this timeframe. It is worth
noting that there were only eight articles published in the Dongfang zazhi 東方雜志from 1904 to
1948 that employed the phrase Dongyang wenhua. The first occurrence was published in 1917 and
dealt with Asianism; and India was obviously not included in this Orient (Junshi 1917).
25. This text did not make any reference to India. The East was again limited to China. 
26. Here I will set aside the academic books specifically dedicated to the topic and consider what
was said about it in the mainstream newspapers and magazines.
27. It is important to underline that such a narrative set a historical precedent for the discourses
promoting a selective appropriation of Western culture. On the one hand, intellectuals who more
or less supported a wholesale westernisation adhered to the idea that there was only one unique
Civilisation – seen as a ladder with the West at the top and Asian countries at a lower level – and
rejected  the  idea  that  India  had  any  influence  on  China.  On  the  other  hand,  people  who
considered  that  cultural  or  civilisational  diversity  existed  and  that  China  should  adopt  the
positive elements of  the West  while  discarding the negative ones often maintained that  this
process of selective appropriation had already taken place in the past with the introduction of
Buddhism. The case of Hu Shi is here exemplary: when he became more and more infatuated
with  the  idea  of  wholesale  westernization  of  China  in  the  twenties,  “China’s  indianization”
became a catastrophe in his writings (Sheel 2014). 
28. According to Peter Beyer, and most scholarship on the subject, the main intellectuals of the
May  Fourth  era  “rejected  the  contemporary  value  of  religion”  (Beyer 2006,  235).  However,
Meyer 2014 has presented a more nuanced description of the attitude of the Chinese toward the
matter. 
29. Wang would later become a renowned specialist of the history of music, but he was at that
time only a local correspondent for the Shenbao in Germany. 
30. I am personally struck by the fact that despite being a relative economic success no Chinese
intellectuals,  except  perhaps  Hu Yuzhi  (Yuzhi 1921) – who was  ultimately  the  one  who made
Indian  Kulturpessimismus  audible  in  China – ever  commented  on  the  thesis  that  Tagore  had
developed in Sadhana.  Liang Shuming gave a hyperbolic illustration of this problem when he
wrote  that  “Tagore never  speculates  on  any  philosophies  and  only  composes  poems”  (sic)
(Liang 1921, 513). 
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31. Chen  is  one  of  the  very  rare  authors  to  discuss  the  problem  of  culture  with  clear  and
complete references to the Western, Japanese and Chinese literatures. This article, for instance,
has 99 footnotes of references and nuanced comments. 
32. Several key intellectual figures of the time, such as Cai Yuanpei and Huang Yanpei 黃炎培
(1878-1965), participated in its inaugural venue.
33. It is also through one of Liang’s associations, the “Lecture Society” (Jiangxue she 講學社), that
Tagore was invited to China.
34. Furthermore Liang’s “Collective Study Association” (Gongxue she 共學社)  did not edit  any
translation of works related to India (except for a few elements in H.G. Wells’s The Outline of
History). In comparison, Russia, and notably Tolstoy, deserved much more attention (Zhang 2006,
140–144).
35. In a later article, Luo would reduce his critical tone toward India, but he would still write that
the Buddha Sakyamuni made the synthesis of earlier Indian schools of thought (Luo 1925, 5) and
would thereby reduce India merely to Buddhism. 
36. The depiction of the Orient and of the place of India within it by Japanese intellectuals started
to evolve in the early twenties, giving place to more nuanced and academic-based discussions –
something  that  however  did  not  prevent  their  political  instrumentalisation  (a  topic  largely
explored in the research related to Asianism). As a matter of fact, in the twenties, when Shiratori
Kurakichi (1865-1942) 白鳥庫吉  and Ichimura Sanjiro 市村瓚次郎(1864-1947) – the fathers of
“Oriental history” – retired, and their former students became more and more specialised in
specific geographical regions of the East, historical research developed toward a more accurate
and comparative direction (Tanaka 1993, 234-239). China had not, however, achieved such level
of institutionalisation and specialisation at the same period. Academic research on India had just
started and it was seemingly not very influential on the debates.
37. In his Chinese Culture of Tomorrow (Zhongguo zhi mingri wenhua 中國之明日文化) – a book that
also produced a tripartite division of  cultures – ,  Zhang Junmai presented his  own work as a
response to Liang’s book, and would later underline the fact that aside from Liang’s, no book had
been published on the subject (Zhang 1935, 1) 
38. Chen 2010 speaks of hundreds of articles (p. 135). For a discussion of a selection of them, cf.
Alitto 1986, 126–134.
39. Wesolowski 2005  offers  probably  the  best-synthesised  presentation  of  Liang  Shuming’s
philosophy of culture. 
40. Two years before, he had already written that “Indians fundamentally reject worldly life”
(Liang 1919, 60).
41. Incidentally, Liang believed that the West was already proceeding to this reorientation. With
their  growing  interest  for  socialism,  the  Westerners  were,  according  to  Liang,  leaving  the
Western path of moving forward and conquering the material world to convert to the Chinese
social path of harmony. On the sinicisation of Western culture, cf. Liang 1921, 502-512.
42. Regarding Liang  Shuming’s  teleological  metanarrative  of  cultures,  and  its  link  with  the
problem of modernity, cf. Major 2017. 
43. This mode of reasoning also pervaded Liang’s attitude toward the West which was reduced to
utilitarianism, and China epitomised by Confucius. 
44. Tagore’s visit to China, despite being a short-term failure, would, however, foster Chinese
interest in their southern neighbour; discussions about Indian wenhua,  understood in a more
general and historic perspective, would flourish during and after his stay. 
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